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Fish are a complex taxonomic group, whose diversity and distance from other vertebrates
well suits the comparative investigation of brain and behavior: in fish species we observe
substantial differences with respect to the telencephalic organization of other vertebrates
and an astonishing variety in the development and complexity of pallial structures. We will
concentrate on the contribution of research on fish behavioral biology for the understanding
of the evolution of the visual system. We shall review evidence concerning perceptual
effects that reflect fundamental principles of the visual system functioning, highlighting the
similarities and differences between distant fish groups and with other vertebrates. We will
focus on perceptual effects reflecting some of the main tasks that the visual system must
attain. In particular, we will deal with subjective contours and optical illusions, invariance
effects, second order motion and biological motion and, finally, perceptual binding of object
properties in a unified higher level representation.
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THE FISH AS A MODEL OF OBJECT PROCESSING IN THE
VISUAL SYSTEM
Fish represent a highly complex taxonomic group, whose
divergence from the other vertebrates is estimated to have
occurred approximately 450 million years ago (Kumar and
Hedges, 1998). Jawless fish (Agnatha) represent one of the old-
est vertebrate forms (Foley and Janvier, 1993). Cartilaginous
fishes (Chondrichthyes), which appeared about 400 million years
ago, represent the oldest extant jawed vertebrates and preserve
a number of their ancestral traits having evolved at a much
slower rate than other classes (Martin et al., 1992). Contrary
to mammals and avians, fish do not actually represent a sin-
gle clade, but a paraphyletic collection of taxa, including jaw-
less, cartilaginous and bony-fish species (Nelson, 2006). Within
the bony-fishes, we find the Actinopterygii or ray-finned fishes,
that alone represent the largest subclass of vertebrates, com-
prising of more than 30 thousand species (mostly belonging
to the superorder of Teleosts). This great taxonomic diver-
sity within fish species, and the phylogenetic distance that
separates fish from other vertebrates, present an invaluable
opportunity for the comparative investigation of brain and
behavior in an evolutionary perspective. We will here concen-
trate on the contribution of research on the behavioral biology
of fish for the understanding of the evolution of the visual
system.
Many fish species rely mainly on vision, using it to guide
a wide range of behaviors (Guthrie, 1986; Brown et al., 2011).
Not surprisingly, it has been demonstrated that fish have well
developed visual capabilities that match those of other vertebrates
(von Frisch, 1914; Douglas and Djamgoz, 1990; Vallortigara,
2004; Brown et al., 2011). In the literature we find a num-
ber of studies on the perception of shape and color in fish
species, showing for example that several Teleost fishes have
excellent trichromatic color vision (Beauchamp, 1978), as well as
the capacity to discriminate two- and three-dimensional shapes
(Schaller, 1926; Herter, 1929, 1930; Hager, 1938; Meesters, 1940;
Mackintosh and Sutherland, 1963; Sutherland, 1964; Mark, 1966;
Wyzisk, 2005; Wyzisk and Neumeyer, 2007; Siebeck et al., 2009;
Schluessel et al., 2012; Gierszewski et al., 2013). Motiopercep-
tion has also been studied in fish, with a particular attention
for model organisms such as zebrafish. Shortly after hatching
zebrafish innately respond to movement with a characteristic
optomotor response (Clark, 1981; Neuhauss et al., 1999). Dif-
ferent species of fish, from Elasmobranchs to Teleosts, have also
revealed sophisticated cognitive abilities in the visual domain,
distinguishing various shapes from their mirror image counter-
parts (Gierszewski et al., 2013) and succeeding in visual cat-
egorization tasks (Schluessel et al., 2012, 2014a,b; Schluessel,
2014).
With regards to the physiological substrate of vision, at
the peripheral level the functioning of the fish visual system
has been extensively studied (especially in morphology and
electrophysiology). The great variety of taxonomic groups and
ecologic niches that we observe in fish, together with their
long evolutionary history, account for the surprising diversity
documented in the organization and function of eyes of dif-
ferent species (Douglas and Djamgoz, 1990). In contrast, until
recently, less was known about the organization and function
of higher visual processing stations in the telencephalon, espe-
cially in comparison with other more well-studied taxa. In
fish, as in amphibians and sauropods, we do not observe a
layered structure resembling the mammalian neocortex, even
though of course the general Bauplan of the vertebrate brain is
respected (Wullimann, 1997; Northcutt, 2011). In recent years,
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our knowledge of the brain functioning and neuroecology of
various fish groups has greatly increased (Teleosts, Broglio et al.,
2011; for Elasmobranchs see Collin, 2012; Yopak, 2012a,b).
This has revealed an astonishing variety in the development
and complexity of pallial structures in different fish species,
sometimes even when considering species belonging to close
groups (Mueller et al., 2008; Mueller and Wullimann, 2009;
Rodríguez-Moldes, 2009; e.g., Actinopterygii differ from all other
vertebrates in that their telencephalon develops by eversion of
the lateral walls and has no lateral ventricles; different species
however show great variation in the degree of eversion, and
thus in the pallial architecture, Nieuwenhuys, 2011). As it has
been the case for other non-mammalian vertebrates, in the
last decade scientists have started to recognize that fish telen-
cephalon is not composed mostly of basal ganglia (subpallium),
but includes wide pallial regions that bear homologies with
the mammalian neocortex. These pallial structures potentially
serve functions similar to the neocortex, instead of being sim-
ply devoted to olfactory processing (Wullimann and Mueller,
2004; Jarvis et al., 2005; Portavella and Vargas, 2005; Rodriguez
et al., 2006; Costa et al., 2011). Despite these increasingly rec-
ognized homologies, the fish brain has clearly less computa-
tional power than what available to the primate cortex (Van
Essen et al., 1992; Hansel and Sompolinsky, 1996; Kawai et al.,
2001; Hill et al., 2003; Horton and Adams, 2005). Thus, the
investigation of the perceptual and cognitive functioning of
fish can provide information about the complexity of the neu-
ral circuitry required for a given function. This is especially
true for those visual phenomena that have been traditionally
considered limited to humans and only a few other mam-
mals.
We shall review evidence obtained in different fish species
concerning perceptual effects that reflect fundamental principles
of the visual system functioning. We will highlight the simi-
larities and differences between distant fish groups and with
other vertebrates. Across most animal species the visual system
faces similar challenges and must fulfill similar requirements to
allow meaningful interaction with physical objects and adaptive
responses to the external environment. In subsequent sections of
the paper, we will focus on four primary tasks that a functional
visual system must attain:
1. Processing of objects as wholes, unified entities, segregated
from the background. This is accomplished by visual inter-
polation processes and grouping mechanisms, whose action is
revealed by phenomena such as amodal completion, illusory
contours and some optical-geometrical illusions. We shall
review evidence of these phenomena in distant fish species,
with implications for the evolution of the corresponding neu-
ral substrates.
2. Ensuring constant perception of invariant object properties
such as size, shape and color, despite the constant modifica-
tion of the physical (proximal) input reaching the retina, due
to changes in viewing distance, perspective and illumination
conditions. Fish species have provided an interesting model
for the study of the neural implementation of size, color and,
recently, shape invariance.
FIGURE 1 | Examples of illusory contours demonstrated in Xenotoca
eiseni (Sovrano and Bisazza, 2009). After being trained to discriminate
different shapes fish were presented with illusory squares and triangles
created through interruption of diagonal lines (A); spatial phase shift of
diagonal lines (B); or through the Kanizsa displays (C).
3. Attentional prioritization and effective processing of complex
motion information. We shall focus on second order motion
and biological motion, two cases of computationally-complex
motion processing that have been recently demonstrated in
fish species.
4. Binding different object properties, such as shape, color and
motion, in a unified higher level representation. In fish as in
other vertebrates, in the earlier stages of visual processing these
properties are processed by independent channels. Bringing
them into a single representation was traditionally considered
an extremely challenging task, carried out by areas of the
associative cortex, a view that has been challenged by the
demonstration of perceptual binding in fish.
VISUAL INTERPOLATION PROCESSES: AMODAL
COMPLETION AND ILLUSORY CONTOURS
Visual illusions are instances of systematic discrepancy between a
physical description of distal or proximal stimuli and perception.
As such, they provide important insight about how the visual
system operates (Bruce et al., 2003). In particular some illusions
provide information on how the visual system integrates sensory
stimulation into a unified representation (Nieder, 2002). The
perception of illusory contours (which are not determined by a
contrast gradient in the physical word, Figure 1) and the amodal
completion of partially occluded objects are primary examples
of the visual system’s ability to interpolate visual information
(Kanizsa, 1979). Both of these phenomena reflect grouping mech-
anisms that promote processing of objects as wholes and underly-
ing neural mechanisms that represent object boundaries regard-
less of how they are defined in the sensory input (Sekuler and
Palmer, 1992; Palmer, 1999; Kellman et al., 2001, 2005; see Nieder,
2002 for a review of neural mechanisms). These traits are likely to
have emerged as a consequence of the adaptive need to segregate
in a unitary percept partially occluded objects or objects presented
through degraded visual information. In fact, form perception is
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possible because the visual system processes sensory information
about shape, color, distance, and movement of objects according
to its own system-specific rules (Kandel et al., 2000). Subjective
contours are the manifestation of these principles, the action
of a network that is predisposed to complete certain figural
elements (Kanizsa, 1976; Gerbino and Salmaso, 1987; Purghé and
Coren, 1992; Nieder and Wagner, 1999). The application of these
processing principles allows the brain to reconstruct contours
missing from the retinal image (Nieder and Wagner, 1999) and
to selectively merge only some parts of the visual scene (Kandel
et al., 2000). When perceiving subjective or amodal contours the
visual system’s response is based on assumptions on the likely state
of things in the external word, rather than on the actual retinal
input (Kanizsa, 1979; Day and Kasperczyk, 1983; Kandel et al.,
2000). These assumptions are of course not to be intended as
conscious explicit inferences, but rather reflect the action of pre-
wired adaptive mechanisms available in the absence of previous
experience at the individual level (e.g., Regolin and Vallortigara,
1995).
As we have mentioned above, a similar neural computational
mechanism is purported to underlie both modal perception of
illusory contours and amodal completion (Kellman and Shipley,
1991; Kellman et al., 2005) (e.g., filling-in mechanisms known in
mammals Kellman et al., 1998; Kandel et al., 2000). Comparative
research in fish has contributed to support this claim, revealing
that species that are sensitive to one of the phenomena tend to
also perceive the other (e.g., see Sovrano and Bisazza, 2008, 2009
for redtail splitfin fish).
Moreover, evidence obtained in fish species helped to under-
stand the phylogenesis of this mechanism. The demonstration
of susceptibility to amodal completion and illusory contours in
this highly diverse taxonomic group, in addition to birds and
mammals, suggests a conserved trait that is widespread in ver-
tebrates and inherited from a common ancestor, rather than a
case of convergent evolution in the different classes. In this regard
it is particularly interesting to consider the high phylogenetic
diversity of the fish species that respond to illusory contours and
amodal completion. For example, illusory contours are perceived
by teleosts as distant as Ostariophysi (redtail splitfin fish, Xenotoca
eiseni) and Acanthopterygii (goldfish, Carassius auratus) (Wyzisk
and Neumeyer, 2007; Sovrano and Bisazza, 2009). Surprisingly,
while in the study of Sovrano and Bisazza (2009) redtail splitfins
were able to recognize also illusory geometric shapes created by
phase shifts or by interruption of diagonal lines, the goldfish
tested by Wyzisk and Neumeyer (2007) could not recognize
phase-shifted illusory shapes. However, this discrepancy may
be due to a methodological problem in the stimuli of Wyzisk
and Neumeyer, which consisted of very thin lines, reducing the
strength of the illusory perception.
Similarly, amodal completion is observed in two species of
Acanthopterygii (Variola louti and Scarus niger), in addition to the
redtail splitfin fish (Sovrano and Bisazza, 2008; Darmaillacq et al.,
2011; Figure 2). Recently it has been found that even cartilaginous
fish (bamboo sharks, Chiloscyllium griseum) are susceptible to
amodal completion and illusory contours (Fuss et al., 2014),
despite being the oldest extant vertebrates and having conserved
many of their ancestral traits (Martin et al., 1992).
FIGURE 2 | Examples of the stimuli employed by Sovrano and Bisazza
(2008) to demonstrate amodal completion of partially occluded objects
in Xenotoca eiseni . In figure (A) and (D), but not in (B) or (C), the circle is
perceived as being complete or amodaly completed behind the occluder.
Remarkable similarities in the distinctive traits of the visual
interpolation effects observed in humans and in fish species
further support the presence of a conserved mechanism. For
example, both in goldfish and in human beings the perception
of Kanizsa figures is disrupted by the superimposition of black
lines (von der Heydt, 2004; Wyzisk and Neumeyer, 2007). This
result, in humans, is considered consistent with the idea that
neurons at the level of V2 are responsible for the perception of
illusory contours. In primates, 60% of V2 neurons respond to
illusory contours (von der Heydt et al., 1984), the same percentage
observed in the visual Wulst of owls (Nieder and Wagner, 1999)1.
This seems to suggest that forebrain structures should provide the
neural basis of these phenomena in fish as well. However, a recent
study in pigeons challenged the view that forebrain structures are
mainly responsible for the perception of illusory contours. This
study showed that pre-tectal neurons are capable or responding
to real and subjective contours alike (Niu et al., 2006). Whether
similar mesencephalic mechanisms are involved in the perception
of illusory contours in fish is a question that calls for empirical
investigation, in order to shed light on the phylogenesis of this
trait in different classes.
GEOMETRICAL ILLUSIONS AND HIERARCHICAL
PROCESSING
Another widely studied class of perceptual phenomena, associated
with grouping mechanisms, is that of geometrical size illusions,
in which properties of a target stimulus, such as length, width,
or diameter, are distorted by the surrounding context, providing
an important tool for the study of perceptual integration of
local elements into global context. Both mammalian and avian
species are susceptible to geometrical illusions. For example, let
us consider the Ponzo perspective illusion, in which two identical
horizontal segments look different in length in the context of two
converging lines, with the segment that is closer to the point of
convergence appearing longer than the other. This illusion has
been demonstrated in horses (Timney and Keil, 1996), monkeys
(Bayne and Davis, 1983; Barbet and Fagot, 2002; see also Fujita,
1996), chimpanzees (Fujita, 1997), and pigeons (Fujita et al.,
1991, 1993; Fujita, 2006; Nakamura et al., 2006, 2009). Simi-
larly, the Müller-Lyer illusion (in which a line segment with two
arrows facing outwards at the end appears longer than one with
arrows facing inwards) deceives capuchins and rhesus monkeys
1Interestingly, perception of subjective contours and neurons performing
interpolation operations that can support them have been found also in insects
(van Hateren et al., 1990; Horridge et al., 1992).
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FIGURE 3 | Examples of the stimuli employed by Sovrano et al.
(submitted; Sovrano, 2014) in Xenotoca eiseni , to investigate the
Ebbinghaus illusion, in which a central circle surrounded by large
circular inducers is perceived as smaller than an identical circle
surrounded by small inducers.
(Suganuma et al., 2007; Tudusciuc and Nieder, 2010), as well as
gray parrots (Pepperberg et al., 2008) and ring doves (Warden and
Baar, 1929).
A less clear case seems to be that of the Ebbinghaus illusion,
in which a central circle surrounded by large circular inducers
is perceived as smaller than an identical circle surrounded by
small inducers (Figure 3). This is one of the strongest geomet-
rical illusions in humans (Ebbinghaus, 1902), but seems absent
or even reversed in non-human primates (Parron and Fagot,
2007) and birds (pigeons and bantams Nakamura et al., 2008,
2014). In humans this illusion reflects the action of grouping
mechanisms (as revealed by the fact that the strength of the
illusion is influenced by the distance between the central target
and the surrounding inducers, Roberts et al., 2005). Thus, the
difficulty of obtaining evidence of its presence in non-human
species seems to indicate a radical difference in the functioning of
these mechanisms between our species and non-human animals.
It has been also suggested that the neural circuitry underlying
to the perception of the Ebbinghaus illusion might have evolved
recently in mammals or even in the primate lineage (Parron
and Fagot, 2007; Nakamura et al., 2008). However, this would
be surprising given the evidence of widespread susceptibility to
amodal completion and illusory contours (reflecting the action of
interpolation and grouping mechanisms) in vertebrates ranging
from mammals to different fish classes (see Section Visual inter-
polation processes: amodal completion and illusory contours).
Notably, the three studies that failed to demonstrate human-like
perception of the Ebbinghaus illusion in non-human animals all
involved training and testing of the animals with touch screens,
which require the subjects to perform a manipulative response
(touching or pecking) and, in the case of pecking, also force a
very close view of the stimuli when emitting the response. In
humans, the Ebbinghaus illusion is also reduced when tested
through motor tasks requiring a manipulative response (Aglioti
et al., 1995; Danckert et al., 2002). This is in line with an involve-
ment of the human neocortex, where the two independent neural
pathways, the dorsal and the ventral stream, are responsible for
visual awareness and for action control (Goodale and Milner,
1992). Moreover, forcing the subjects to inspect the stimuli from a
close distance could have prompted them to pay attention only to
the central target or to its immediate proximity. This could have
caused the direction of the illusion to be reversed, transforming
it into an assimilation illusion (analogous to what is observed in
humans when the distal portion of the inducers is not visible,
Oyama, 1960; Weintraub, 1979). In support of this interpretation,
human-like perception of the Ebbinghaus illusion was reported
in a recent study with domestic chicks that employed a more
naturalistic training procedure, based on incidental learning, and
a test procedure allowing the animals to observe the stimuli at a
freely chosen looking distance (Rosa Salva et al., 2013). In this
study, subjects that were habituated to finding food behind a
screen depicting, for instance, a small orange circle, and then
tested with the illusory configurations, preferred to look behind
the screen depicting the perceptually smaller circle. Thus, when
appropriate procedures are used, avian species are also found
to be susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion. Most interestingly,
using similar naturalistic training and testing procedures, we have
been recently able to demonstrate the perception of this geometric
illusion in teleost fish, finding that redtail splitfin fish also perceive
the Ebbinghaus illusion as a contrast illusion (Sovrano, 2014;
Sovrano et al., submitted). Different groups of fish were trained
to locate the exit marked by a bigger or a smaller orange circle,
in order to escape from the test arena and rejoin conspecifics.
When tested with the illusory configurations, fish trained on
the bigger orange circle preferred to approach the circle that
appeared perceptually bigger in the Ebbinghaus display (i.e., the
orange circle surrounded by small gray inducers). Similarly, fish
reinforced on the smaller orange circle preferred to approach the
illusory display in which the central circle appeared perceptually
smaller (being surrounded by big inducers).
Moreover, in contrast with previous unsuccessful attempts
with goldfish (Wyzisk, 2005; but see Herter, 1930 for an earlier
report with small sample size, finding discrepant results), in a
recent study it has been demonstrated that teleost fish (redtail
splitfin) can perceive the Müller-Lyer illusion (Müller-Lyer, 1889),
like humans and other vertebrates do (Sovrano, 2014; Sovrano
et al., in preparation; Figure 4). Fish were trained to discriminate
between two lines of different length. Reinforcement was provided
by the possibility to rejoin conspecifics, escaping from the test
arena through an exit, recognizable since it was marked by a
longer or a shorter line. Then fish were presented with two
lines of the same length with two arrow-shaped inducers facing
inwards or outwards. Subjects chose the stimulus that, on the
basis of the perception of the Müller-Lyer illusion, appeared
deceptively larger or smaller, consistent with the condition of
training. Curiously enough, another existing study investigating
the perception of the Müller-Lyer display in a fish species revealed
that bamboo sharks are not deceived by this illusion (Fuss et al.,
2014). Elasmobranchs (sharks and rays) belong to the class of
cartilaginous fishes. Thus, a possibility for reconciling these con-
tradictory results would be to hypothesize that cartilaginous and
bony fish differ in their ability to perceive geometric illusions in
general, or the Müller-Lyer display in particular. This would have
important implications for our understanding of the phylogenesis
of the visual system, indicating that the neural substrate for the
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FIGURE 4 | Examples of the stimuli employed by Sovrano et al. (in
preparation; Sovrano, 2014) in Xenotoca eiseni , to investigate the
Müller-Lyer illusion, in which a line with two arrow-shaped inducers at
its ends facing outwards (A) appears longer than an identical one with
inducers at its ends facing inwards (B). In a control condition (upper part
of this figure) the line is of a different color than the inducers (the line is red
while the inducers are still black). In this condition the line was red also
during training.
perception of this geometrical illusion could have evolved after the
separation of cartilaginous and bony fish. Due to the great phylo-
genetic distance between sharks and teleost, and in particular to
divergent developmental processing (Northcutt, 1977; Wullimann
and Mueller, 2004; Nieuwenhuys, 2009), major differences can
be observed in the brain organization between these different
classes, justifying the idea of a real dissociation of perceptual
mechanisms available to cartilaginous and bony fishes. Notably,
bamboo sharks tested in the same study were able to perceive
Kanizsa figures and illusory contours (Fuss et al., 2014). This
could indicate that the perception of subjective contours depends
on conserved neural mechanisms that emerged earlier in phylo-
genesis than those underlying to the perception of the Müller-
Lyer illusion, which could have been evolved after the divergence
of cartilaginous and bony fish. Another possible interpretation
would be, of course, that the mechanism allowing perception
of subjective contours has an adaptive value in a wider range
of species, including Elasmobranchs, and has thus been evolved
independently multiple times. However, caution is needed before
venturing too far with evolutionary interpretations on the basis
of data collected only in two species and in two studies that
employed different training methodologies. In the study of Fuss
et al. (2014) sharks were food reinforced for pressing their nose
against the wall just below/onto the positive stimulus, implying
a very close inspection of the stimuli. On the contrary, red tail
splitfins learned to use line length to orient in the test tank and
locate its exit. Also, for the bamboo sharks tested by Fuss and
colleagues, learning the line-length discrimination task resulted
much more difficult than the other tasks trained in this study
(e.g., in Experiment 3a only three sharks out of eight managed
to learn to discriminate three pairs of lines based on their length,
and none of them was able to learn the fourth pair proposed).
Bamboo sharks seem thus to be not very sensitive to differences in
line lengths in general, even when these differences are real rather
than illusory. Interestingly, the goldfish trained by Wyzisk (2005),
who also did not seem to perceive the Müller-Lyer illusion, had an
even worse performance in learning the line discrimination task
than the bamboo sharks. It is thus possible to hypothesize that
the illusion itself could affect also sharks and goldfish, but that
its extent, in the version tested by Fuss et al. (2014) would not be
enough to create a sufficiently pronounced difference in perceived
line length to reliably sustain performance. In fact, one of the
six individuals tested in Experiment 3b seemed to be affected
by the illusion, systematically choosing the display with inverted
arrowheads. Also in the human species the Müller-Lyer illusion
evokes only a slight deception and does not affect all individuals
(Rivers, 1901; Segall et al., 1966; Berry, 1968), revealing again a
striking similarity between the mechanisms present in very distant
species.
The perception of geometrical illusions, such as those cre-
ated by the Ebbinghaus or Müller-Lyer displays, has been often
linked to the tendency of a species or of an individual to apply
either a more global or a local processing strategy (Parron and
Fagot, 2007; Nakamura et al., 2009, 2014; Rosa Salva et al.,
2013). In fact, the tendency of the visual system to process visual
configurations as wholes, rather than focusing on single details
in isolation, allows contextual elements surrounding the target
object to distort its perception. Since the seminal work of Navon
(1977, 1981), hierarchical stimuli have been used to investigate
the interplay of local and global processing in different species
and in different tasks. In hierarchical stimuli a bigger global
configuration is created by the juxtaposition of many smaller
figures (Figure 5). The human species seems to be endowed with
a remarkably globally-oriented perceptual style that makes us
see “the forest before the trees” (Navon, 1977). That is to say, in
most situations we tend to prioritize the processing of the bigger
configuration (global level), rather than of the smaller figures
composing it. On the contrary, evidence obtained in non-human
primates and in some other species seemed to indicate a general
tendency to prioritize the local information about the individual
shapes, bringing some authors to suggest that a globally-oriented
perceptual style would be limited to humans, with the possible
exception of some great apes (e.g., Fagot and Deruelle, 1997;
Deruelle and Fagot, 1998; Cavoto and Cook, 2001). Over the
years evidence accumulated indicating that this is likely to be an
extreme oversimplification. For instance, depending on the con-
text of the current task and on viewing conditions, humans can
display a locally oriented perceptual style (Kimchi, 1992), whereas
pigeons (traditionally considered an exemplar case of locally-
oriented perception, Cerella, 1980; Cavoto and Cook, 2001) are
able to flexibly switch the focus of their attention between the local
and the global level (Fremouw et al., 1998, 2002). Notably, the
first clear demonstration of global dominance in the perception
of hierarchical stimuli in non-human animals has been obtained
few years ago in red tail splitfin fish trained according to the same
general procedure described above for the demonstration of the
Ebbinghaus and Müller-lyer illusions (Truppa et al., 2010). Again,
this suggests that, when ecologically valid training and testing
procedures are used, it is possible to demonstrate remarkable
similarities in the grouping mechanism employed by the visual
system of fish and of other vertebrates, despite great phylogenetic
distance.
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FIGURE 5 | Stimuli employed by Truppa et al. (2010) to investigate
processing of hierarchical stimuli in Xenotoca eiseni . On the left side
are the consistent stimuli presented, in which the same shape is
represented at the global and local level; on the right side are the
inconsistent stimuli, in which the shape information provided by the local
and the global level conflict. Across the three different conditions (A, B and
C), stimuli differed in absolute size and in the density of the local elements.
INVARIANCE EFFECTS: IS CORTEX NEEDED FOR INVARIANT
COLOR PERCEPTION?
Some of the visual illusions mentioned above have been hypoth-
esized to reflect the action of adaptations evolved to ensure
invariance in perception, despite huge variations in the physical
parameters of the retinal input (e.g., Gregory, 1963; but see
Humphrey and Morgan, 1965). For example, the Ponzo perspec-
tive illusion might involve the same mechanisms that give rise to
the perception of size invariance (the tendency to perceive the
absolute size of a known object, despite differences in the size
of the pattern projected on the retina when the object is viewed
from various distances) (Gregory, 1963; Fujita, 1996; but see
Georgeson and Blakemore, 1973; Newman and Newman, 1974).
Research in fish species has a long tradition for the investiga-
tion of size invariance, that has been demonstrated repeatedly
in Actinopterygii species (Herter, 1930; Douglas et al., 1988;
Schuster et al., 2004; Frech et al., 2012). In addition to that,
more recently, form invariance has also been shown in Malawi
cichlids (Pseudotropheus sp., Schluessel et al., 2014b; see Wood,
2013 for evidence that the ability to form viewpoint-invariant
representations of 3D objects represents a core and experience-
independent cognitive trait).
Here we will concentrate on an exemplar case, describing the
contribution of fish as an animal model of the physiological
basis of color invariance, the mechanisms by which the visual
system recognizes an object as having a consistent color regardless
of the spectral composition of the light reflecting from it at
a given moment (see Foster, 2011 for a comprehensive review
on this phenomenon). Simultaneous color contrast is a related
phenomenon to color invariance. In this case the perceived hue
of a small visual region is altered by the presence of a colored
surround: gray regions are perceived as of a hue complementary
to that of the surround, whereas colored regions assume a hue
“away” from that of the surround (Graham and Brown, 1965).
At the behavioral level, research on a very popular model
organism, the goldfish, has demonstrated that this species is
able to make color-constant judgments, implying the percep-
tion of color invariance (Ingle, 1985; Neumeyer et al., 2002).
Simultaneous color contrast has been demonstrated in various
Teleost species, including goldfish and other two Cyprinids (Tinca
vulgaris and Barbus paripentazona), two Cichlid (Hemichromis
bimaculatus and Pterophyllum scalare), the three-spined stickle-
back and a Gasterosteidae (Gasterosteus aculeatus) (Herter, 1950;
Dörr and Neumeyer, 1997).
One of the most relevant models for understanding how
the visual system could implement color invariance and color
contrast effects is the retinex model by Edwin Land (Land,
1959a,b, 1983; McCann and Benton, 1969; Land and McCann,
1971; Land et al., 1983). This model theorizes a mechanism that
computes, for each visual region, the relations between spectral
features, based on the comparison of the lightness informa-
tion provided by each photoreceptor system, and then collates
them between distant regions2. The term retinex was coined
combining the words retina and cortex, due to the uncertainty
on the location of the neural substrate for these computations.
Neural mechanisms underlying to color invariance have been
identified over the years: partial chromatic adaptation (within-
class cone adaptation), spatial comparisons of cone and cone-
opponent signals and invariant responses. These operate at dif-
ferent levels in the visual system. An incomplete chromatic
adaptation takes place in the retina’s horizontal cells and in
the geniculate nucleus (Creutzfeldt et al., 1991a,b; Lee et al.,
1999). In line with what hypothesized by Land, recordings in
the retina of goldfish revealed that the horizontal-cell network
modulates the processing of cone signals so as to render the
ratio of the responses of the three cone-systems stable across
illumination conditions (Kamermans et al., 1998; Kraaij et al.,
1998).
However, retinal adaptation mechanisms act locally and are
not sufficient to fully explain the phenomena associated with
color invariance. It is thus believed that, in the primate visual
system, computations over spatially extended regions accounting
for non-local effects take place in the primary visual cortex V1
or at higher stages of processing (e.g., V4) (Foster, 2011). Two
different mechanisms for color-invariance have been discovered
2In fact, variations in spectral composition of distant regions of the visual field
affect the perceived color of an object as much as in nearby regions (Land,
1983; Land et al., 1983).
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in primate V1. The first one is still involved in computations
over less spatially extended regions and is based on double-
opponent neurons that present both color and spatial opponency.
This allows the computation of local ratios of cone activity, in
line with what predicted by the retinex model. Double opponent
cells, before being identified in the primary visual cortex of
macaques (Conway, 2001; Conway and Livingstone, 2006), were
first discovered in the goldfish retina (Daw, 1967), providing a
neural substrate that could partially support color invariance in
this species. However, this mechanism can compute the relations
between reflectance of nearby areas only. It is thus not sufficient
to fully explain color invariance, which involves effects over more
spatially extended regions (Land, 1983; Land et al., 1983). In mon-
keys, networks supporting such comparisons have been identified
in V1 and V4 (see Foster, 2011 for a review). In fish there are
no known cortex homologs, prompting a question about which
neural substrate supports this shared phenomenon within such a
differently organized visual system.
SECOND ORDER MOTION AND BIOLOGICAL MOTION
Up to now we have explored the perception of static visual objects,
with particular attention to grouping mechanisms ensuring the
perception of objects as units segregated from the background
and to mechanisms that allow to perceive objects’ properties as
constant, despite the continuos variation of the physical input
reaching the retina. We will now examine the contribution of
research on fish species to our understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the perception of two peculiar kinds of motion, sec-
ond order motion and biological motion. We want to warn the
reader, however, that this is somewhat an arbitrary distinction
that we follow for the sake of argumentation. For instance, it is
well known that motion is an extremely important cue for object-
background segregation (biological or agentive motion represents
a paradigmatic case on this regard Bertenthal and Pinto, 1994;
Oram and Perrett, 1996; Giese and Poggio, 2003; Ibbotson, 2007;
Nishida, 2011).
Objects that are moving in space are changing their current
state and need to be more closely monitored than static objects.
Immediate recognition and effective processing of movement in
a visual scene is thus crucial for survival and widespread in
animal species. On the contrary, only vertebrates having a more
sophisticated visual system (i.e., an elaborated cortex, such as that
of mammals), were traditionally supposed to be able to perceive
second order motion (Ohzawa, 1999). Second order motion is a
peculiar type of motion impression elicited by stimuli in which
only second-order features, such as contrast, texture or flicker,
are moving (also known as non-Fourier motion) (Ramachandran
et al., 1973; Chubb and Sperling, 1988; Cavanagh and Mather,
1989). There is electrophysiological, psychophysical and neu-
ropsychological evidence that, in the cortex of mammals, second-
order motion is carried out by a dedicate stream (Albright,
1992; Zhou and Baker, 1993; Smith et al., 1998; Baker, 1999).
This supported the view according to which the perception of
second-order motion would represent an instance of “higher
level” motion processing, limited to primates and few other
mammals. Despite that, we now know that zebrafish larvae show
an optomotor response to motion stimuli that is qualitatively
similar to what is observed in primates, reacting in the same
way to first- and second-order motion (Orger et al., 2000; see
Theobald et al., 2008 for subsequent evidence of second-order
motion perception in invertebrates). This strongly undermines
the idea that a primate-like organized visual cortex is necessary
to perceive second-order motion, suggesting that this is already
processed in earlier stages of vertebrates’ visual system (possibly
even on the basis of retinal sensitivity to some second-order
features, Shapley and Victor, 1978; Demb et al., 2001). However,
it is also possible to hypothesize that similar computations to
those occurring in the primate cortex to support the perception of
second-order motion are carried out by circuitry located in pallial
structures of the fish telencephalon (see Jarvis et al., 2005 for a
review on the homologies between non-mammalian pallium and
mammalian neocortex).
Not all forms of motion are equally relevant for survival:
objects belonging to biologically relevant categories, such as
conspecifics, preys and predators, can be recognized thanks to
the presence of specific movement patterns, typical of animate
creatures in general or of a given species in particular. Humans’
extreme sensitivity to the motion of biological creatures (bio-
logical motion) has been revealed using the so called point-light
displays (PLD; Johansson, 1973). In these stimuli only a dozen
of isolated light-points are visible, strategically placed on the
major limb joints of a moving person (or animal), presented
on an otherwise homogeneous background. As a consequence,
PLD provide very little information about the shape or outline of
the moving figure, presenting selectively the motion information.
Despite the very sparse visual information available in PLD, as
soon as these are put in motion, the impression of a moving
animate creature is immediately and inevitably elicited in human
adults. Human observers are also able to extract rapidly and
effortlessly a large amount of information from PLD of biolog-
ical motion, even in conditions of degraded visual presentation
(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983; Bertenthal and Pinto, 1994; Neri
et al., 1998; Sumi, 2000; Troje, 2002; Thurman and Grossman,
2008; Alaerts et al., 2011; Sokolov et al., 2011; Pavlova, 2012;
Krüger et al., 2013). Specialized neural circuits for the processing
of biological motion have been found in the temporal cortex
of human and nonhuman primates (in the superior temporal
sulcus, STS, Oram and Perrett, 1994; Grossman et al., 2000;
Vaina et al., 2001; Jastorff et al., 2012). This cortical special-
ization emerges during ontogenesis through the interaction of
predisposed mechanisms that prioritize the processing of some
specific motion features typical of animate creatures and of the
extensive expertise we gain by constant exposure to and pro-
cessing of this sort of stimulus. In fact, the ability to recognize
biological motion depicted in PLD, and the tendency to pay
preferential attention to this stimulus, is already present in new-
born infants (Simion et al., 2008). Most interestingly, analogous
abilities and predispositions to process semi-rigid motion had
been previously reported in visually naive newly hatched chicks
and quails (Yamaguchi and Fujita, 1999; Regolin et al., 2000;
Vallortigara et al., 2005; Vallortigara and Regolin, 2006), suggest-
ing the presence of conserved mechanisms in distant vertebrate
species (Johnson, 2006; Troje and Westhoff, 2006; Vallortigara,
2012). Conditioning procedures have been used to prove that
Frontiers in Neural Circuits www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 119 | 7
Rosa Salva et al. Fish brains and visual perception
also other species of mammals and avians can be trained to
discriminate biological motion, which could support the idea
of homologous mechanisms (Perrett et al., 1990; Omori and
Watanabe, 1996; Dittrich et al., 1998; Tomonaga, 2001; Troje and
Aust, 2013). However, one of the most remarkable features of
human perception of biological motion is the fact that processing
of PLD occurs in an effortless and preattentive manner (e.g.,
Thornton and Vuong, 2004). To understand whether similar
mechanisms are employed also by non-human species it is impor-
tant to test the presence of spontaneous responses to biological
motion stimuli. Until recently, galliformes were the only species
in which researchers demonstrated a spontaneous response to
biological motion resembling what is observed in humans, with
the possible exception of female marmosets (Brown et al., 2010).
Nothing at all was known about the ability to perceive biological
motion in classes other than mammals and avians. To fill this
gap, Nakayasu and Watanabe (2014) exploited the spontaneous
tendency of medaka fish (Oryzias latipes, another member of
the class of Actinopterygii, family Adrianichthyidae) to increase
shoaling behavior when seeing moving conspecifics. This indi-
cates that visual mechanisms for the detection of biological
motion could be evolutionarily more conserved than previously
thought. In this study, medaka fish spent significantly more time
swimming along a screen on which they could see a PLD of a
swimming conspecific than along a screen on which a PLD of a
rigid motion was visible. In addition, medakas proved to be able
to discriminate different kinds of biological motion, preferring
the motion pattern of conspecifics to human motion and being
particularly sensitive to the smoothness and the speed of the
movement. This is particularly relevant since, also in our species,
the speed of movement can drastically alter the perception of
biological motion, with abnormal speeds giving the impression
of unnatural (e.g., robotic or moon-walk) movements (Barclay
et al., 1978). Moreover, both humans (Kozlowski and Cutting,
1977; Barclay et al., 1978; Cai et al., 2011) and the fish tested
by Nakayasu and Watanabe (2014) seem to be more affected if
the movement sequences were slowed down than if velocity was
increased.
BINDING OF MULTIPLE PROPERTIES OF VISUAL OBJECTS IN
A UNIFIED REPRESENTATION
In the first part of this review we have concentrated mainly on
early visual processes that, starting from a fragmented retinal
input, support the creation of a unitary object-percept with
invariant properties (e.g., perceptual grouping mechanisms that
ensure the processing of an object as a whole, involved in the
perception of subjective contours and geometric illusions and
possibly in invariance-effects Sekuler and Palmer, 1992; Palmer,
1999; Kellman et al., 2001, 2005). However, in order to interact
effectively with objects in the real word, organisms must conduct
also more advanced sensory processing that allows them to bind
the multiple properties of a given object into a unified higher-
level representation. So, after an initial stage of processing carried
out by specialized detectors responding selectively to different
properties, such as shape, color and movement (Zeki and Shipp,
1988), the visual system must perform the challenging task of
perceptual binding in order to allow adaptive behavior in the real
world (Treisman, 1996; Roskies, 1999; Wolfe and Cave, 1999).
Computationally, binding is considered a highly demanding task,
requiring sophisticated neural circuitry to subtend it. Together
with the fact that conjunction tasks seem to be particularly dif-
ficult for non-human primates (Smith et al., 2004), the absence of
clear-cut evidence of this ability in invertebrates and in vertebrates
with “simpler” nervous systems, supported the view that only the
mammalian cortex (Zeki and Shipp, 1988; Shafritz et al., 2002;
Robertson, 2003; Botly and De Rosa, 2009; DiCarlo et al., 2012)
or the avian pallium (Cook, 1992; Blough and Blough, 1997; Jarvis
et al., 2005; Katz et al., 2010) could provide a neural substrate
with enough computational power for binding (Shettleworth,
2008). In the monkey brain, for example, a higher-level associative
region (the superior temporal polysensory area, STPa) contains
neurons whose response is driven by a conjunction of the prop-
erties of form and motion of walking agents (Van Essen et al.,
1992; Oram and Perrett, 1996). Given the seemingly universal
adaptive value of the capacity to bind multiple object features
in a unified representation, however, it would be surprising that
no other complexing-behaving animals, outside the mammal and
avian classes, evolved this capability. In fact, earlier reports of
binding-like abilities in invertebrates and anuran species (Ewert
et al., 1979; Schubert et al., 2002) were recently followed by the
demonstration that zebrafish can use feature-binding to direct
their shoaling behavior (Neri, 2012; in order to demonstrate true
perceptual binding, the animal must for example discriminate
between two multiple-objects sets, each set containing both fea-
tures in different objects, with the sole cue for discrimination
being the way in which the two features are combined in the
same visual object, Shepard et al., 1961; Treisman, 1996; Wolfe
and Cave, 1999). In this study zebrafish spontaneously chose to
associate with a “natural” movie of swimming conspecifics rather
than with a backward version of the movie, while they did not
react to another violation that also created an unfamiliar visual
scene (movie presented upside down). In the backward movie,
movement and shape information were both still present and
virtually unaltered, but were inconsistent with each other. To
recognize the original movie from the backward one fish needed
to integrate form and motion, performing a conjunction task
on two attributes that, in primates, are processed by different
cortical regions (Zeki and Shipp, 1988; see Sajovic and Levinthal,
1982; Klar and Hoffmann, 2002; Masseck and Hoffmann, 2008,
2009; for evidence of dedicated centers for processing motion
information in fish species). This result was then replicated in
the same study (Neri, 2012) with computer generated stimuli
that were more controlled, even though less natural: an image
representing a side view of a zebrafish was moved along a linear
trajectory, which could be either consistent or inconsistent with
the orientation of the image of the zebrafish (the direction toward
which it was facing). As long as a sufficient number of individuals
was depicted in this artificial animation, zebrafish were able to
direct their response on the basis of the conjunction of motion
direction and shape orientation, even when stimuli were con-
structed using images of another species (needlefish, Xenentodon)
or when only the frontal part of a zebrafish image was visible.
The implications of these results for our understanding of the
way the visual system supports such sophisticated operations are
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apparent if we consider the vast disparity in available circuitry
between primate and teleost (Van Essen et al., 1992; Hansel
and Sompolinsky, 1996; Kawai et al., 2001; Hill et al., 2003;
Horton and Adams, 2005). This means that the computations
necessary for supporting perceptual binding need much less
complex neural circuitry than we previously believed (Treisman,
1996; Shafritz et al., 2002; Robertson, 2003). Interestingly, a
recent work on imprinting in domestic chicks revealed that these
newborn and visually naive subjects spontaneously bind color
and shape features into integrated representations at the onset
of their experience with visual objects (Wood, 2014), suggesting
the presence of a core mechanism devoted to this fundamental
task.
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
We have reviewed studies that reveal the mechanisms used by
the visual system of fish for adaptive object perception. The
fundamental functioning principles that allow the appreciation of
objects as unified entities, segregated from the background and
characterized by invariant properties seem to be shared between
species belonging to distant vertebrate classes, including the oldest
extant jawed vertebrates. Moreover, Actinopterygii belonging to
two different orders are able to perceive second-order motion
and biological motion, whose perception in humans is ascribed
to the action of specialized cortical areas, and to bind motion
and shape properties of a single object in a higher order repre-
sentation. Perceptual binding, in particular, is intimately linked
to higher-level cognitive phenomena such as attention (Treisman,
1996; Robertson, 2003) and has been traditionally considered a
computationally challenging task, requiring the full power of the
mammalian neocortex.
One of the most important implications of these results is that
they challenge the assumption that only the mammalian neocor-
tex (or the avian pallium, Jarvis et al., 2005) has the computational
power required to perform the sophisticated operations needed to
perceive some of the above mentioned phenomena. The evidence
reviewed in this paper must be interpreted in the context of the
increasingly recognized presence of pallial structures in the fish
telencephalon (e.g., Mueller and Wullimann, 2005, 2009). Nev-
ertheless, the undeniable disparity in available circuitry between
primates and Teleosts still needs to be considered (Van Essen
et al., 1992; Hansel and Sompolinsky, 1996; Kawai et al., 2001;
Hill et al., 2003; Horton and Adams, 2005). Existent studies in
fish have already given insight in the neural mechanisms that
support some of these shared abilities (e.g., in the case of color
invariance), providing a most fruitful ground for further investi-
gation. Another crucial aspect highlighted by research in fish is the
similarity in the characteristics of the effects observed in distant
classes of vertebrates. For example, both in fish and in humans the
perception of Kanizsa figures is disrupted by the same manipula-
tion (von der Heydt, 2004; Wyzisk and Neumeyer, 2007), and the
perception of biological motion is similarly affected by changes
in speed (Kozlowski and Cutting, 1977; Barclay et al., 1978; Cai
et al., 2011; Nakayasu and Watanabe, 2014). These remarkable
similarities may indicate an analogous organization, in distant
vertebrates, of the neural circuitry involved in these perceptual
effects.
On the basis of the above mentioned evidence that suggest
“cortical-like” computational circuitry in fish, we can identify
some important venues for future research. First of all, it is neces-
sary to increase our knowledge of the organization and origins of
the pallial structures in the fish telencephalon. Only by describing
in greater detail the homologies between these structures and
those composing the mammalian neocortex, we will be able to
fully grasp the implications of the behavioral similarities that we
have described here. A very promising approach on this regard
is that offered by Mueller and Wullimann (2009), who used
the zebrafish as a genetic model to search for developmental
similarities between Teleosts and mammals, with a focus on early
gene expression. These authors propose that the telencephalon of
teleosts has evolved by partial eversion, recognizing homologies
with all four mammalian pallial areas. In the light of the prin-
ciple that recognition of homologies is independent of function
and connectivity, we face some intriguing related questions. For
example, are these similar perceptual functions implemented
by homologous structures? Do these similar functions require
structurally similar circuits sharing some specific patterns of
connectivity? And, going back to behavioral research, what is
possible to do with such brains? What is the role of homologies
and structural analogies in the determination of the cognitive
functions available to an organism?
Fish are an excellent model to investigate perceptual phenom-
ena, not only for their great taxonomic diversity and peculiarly
organized telencephalon, but also for the presence of sophisticated
visually guided behavior, allowing one to investigate not only
perceptual organization, but also higher cognitive visual func-
tions (Schluessel et al., 2012, 2014a,b; Gierszewski et al., 2013;
Schluessel, 2014). In addition to being amenable to traditional
training procedures, fish perceptual abilities can be investigated
also through more naturalistic incidental learning tasks allowing
the animal to freely choose the viewing distance from the stimuli
(Truppa et al., 2010; Sovrano et al., submitted; in preparation).
On this regard it is important to consider the evidence that we
have summarized on the perception of the Ebbinghaus illusion,
of the Müller-Lyer illusion and on the processing of hierarchical
stimuli (see Section Geometrical illusions and hierarchical pro-
cessing). These three cases beautifully exemplify the importance
of the availability of a number of procedures that can be employed
in the same species. This possibility is a necessary prerequisite
for a meaningful comparison of the results obtained in different
species. We have, in fact, seen that the task-context may actually
account for the apparent inter-species differences observed in the
susceptibility to perceptual phenomena. In addition to advocating
caution with the interpretation of evidence obtained in very
diverse settings, we can also propose a venue for further research.
Future studies should systematically explore, on the same set of
animal models, the effect of the different tasks that are typically
applied to different species. For example, it would be interesting to
adapt to fish species the touch screen/skinner box procedures that
are usually employed with pigeons and other birds. Fish can be
trained to respond by touching the stimuli or pressing a button in
order to obtain a food reward in the close proximity of the visual
display. In this case, would they flexibly change their response
similarly to what is seen in avian species? Would they adopt a
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more locally oriented perceptual style and a smaller attentional
focus? It is interesting to note that the bamboo sharks tested by
Fuss et al. (2014), which did not seem to perceive the Müller-Lyer
illusion, were trained to respond by pressing their snout on the
stimuli. Unfortunately, this is the only study that investigated the
perception of this illusion in a cartilaginous fish species. We are
thus unable to draw firm conclusions from this evidence, pointing
once again to the need of a systematic investigation of this issue.
Most interestingly, recent studies have also started to exploit
fish spontaneous shoaling behavior (Neri, 2012). This offers a
great opportunity to study homologies in phenomena such as
biological motion, whose perception in humans stands out for
occurring in an effortless and preattentive manner (e.g., Thorn-
ton and Vuong, 2004). Indeed, spontaneous social responses to
biological motion have been shown in naive chicks (Vallortigara
et al., 2005; Vallortigara and Regolin, 2006), and, recently, also
in medaka fish (Nakayasu and Watanabe, 2014). This highlights
another promising venue for future research, which could put
the study of perceptual processes and of their neural bases in the
context of social behavior. A similar approach has been used with
galliform chicks. Research in domestic chicks revealed that they
are endowed with a set of unlearned perceptual and cognitive
mechanisms that predispose them to appropriate social interac-
tions. These early mechanisms are, thus, tightly linked to the
evolutionary pressures posed by the social environment. Overall,
chicks’ perceptual and cognitive predispositions ensure prefer-
ential processing of stimuli associated with conspecifics, direct
imprinting toward appropriate stimuli, maintain the brood cohe-
sion and facilitate social learning (e.g., Regolin and Vallortigara,
1995; Johnston et al., 1998; Rosa Salva et al., 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, in press; Daisley et al., 2010; Mascalzoni et al., 2010; Regolin
et al., 2011; Vallortigara, 2012). With regard to fish species, a
related approach can be found in the work of Rui Oliveira.
This research is centered on the study of social competence and
of the cognitive processes involved in it, with an integrative
approach and a particular focus on the zebrafish as an animal
model (Oliveira, 2012; Taborsky and Oliveira, 2012). Among
other things, these studies aim to understand how the brain
translates social information into flexible behavioral responses,
how this impacts on individual fitness, and how this process is
constrained by the individual developmental history or by trade-
offs with other adaptive competences (Taborsky and Oliveira,
2012). Teleost fish represent an ideal model to identify basic
information processing mechanisms that provide the functional
building blocks of social behavior across different species with
varying social systems. In fact, among teleosts we have a pro-
nounced diversity of social systems in closely related species.
This allows for planned phylogenetic comparisons of perceptual
and cognitive abilities. Moreover, model species such a zebrafish
also offer genetic tools for the study of selected neural circuits
(Oliveira, 2012), making this a most promising field of research
for future interdisciplinary studies.
Future studies should thus capitalize on the potential insights
offered by fish species to understand the evolution of the verte-
brate visual system, especially by further investigating the neural
correlates of perceptual organization in species belonging to dis-
tant taxa. On this regard, an important aim for future work should
be to increase our knowledge of the perceptual abilities of species
specifically selected because of their informative value, based on
their phylogenetic relation with other species of known perceptual
abilities. A particular case is that of jawless fish (Agnatha), such as
lampreys and hagfish, whose susceptibility to some fundamental
perceptual phenomena has never been tested, despite their great
phylogenetic interest.
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